UAE's Gas Deal in Syria: A Triple Win for the US? Geopolitics Explained (2025)

Is the UAE's Bold Move in Syria Setting Up a Triple Victory for Washington? Imagine a high-stakes chess game where the Middle East is the board, and control over Syria's energy resources could tip the balance of power—forever sidelining Russia in the region. This isn't just geopolitics; it's a calculated gamble that could reshape global alliances. But here's where it gets controversial...

The United States and Great Britain are intensifying their strategies to maintain the strategic edge they gained in the Middle East by sidelining Russia's key ally in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad, back in December. Syria isn't just any nation; it's a vital thread in the region's intricate tapestry of politics, economics, religion, and security. Its strategic location also serves as a crucial bridge southward to Africa and westward to Europe, thanks to its extensive Mediterranean coastline—a point I delve into deeply in my latest book on the evolving global oil market landscape (available at https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY). To ensure Syria remains aligned with Western interests, the focus is on revitalizing its economy through investments and direct support from Western companies. A prime area of emphasis? Restoring the country's primary revenue streams from gas and oil exports. Conveniently, these ventures provide legal grounds for Western firms to deploy 'security' personnel at these sites, safeguarding their investments with whatever additional measures they deem necessary.

Drawing lessons from past interventions in Iraq and Libya—where prolonged Western presence was often seen as a modern-day crusade by locals—Washington and London are taking a smarter approach this time. They're collaborating with friendly Arab nations to avoid similar backlash, making the whole operation seem more regional and less domineering. Enter the United Arab Emirates (UAE), whose powerhouse company, Dana Gas, recently inked a preliminary agreement with Syria's state oil entity to explore redevelopment of the nation's natural gas fields.

For context, these fields formed the backbone of Syria's economy for decades, alongside oil, and weathered the 13-year civil war with comparatively less damage. Before the conflict erupted, Syria was producing about 316 billion cubic feet per day (bcf/d) of dry natural gas—that's roughly the energy equivalent of powering millions of homes—from proven reserves totaling 8.5 trillion cubic feet (tcf). Russia, eyeing Syria's vast oil reserves and its invaluable Mediterranean access, had established a strong foothold there even before the war kicked off in 2011. By 2009, Russian firm Stroytransgaz had started expanding Syria's South-Central Gas Area, ramping up production by around 40% by 2011. This surge helped gas and oil exports account for a full quarter of the government's income, positioning Syria as the eastern Mediterranean's top energy producer at the time.

Russia's military support for President al-Assad led to the 2015 Cooperation Plan, aimed at rebuilding at least 40 energy facilities (starting with gas but including offshore oil) and bolstering the power sector. Key projects included revamping the Aleppo thermal plant, installing the Deir Ezzor power plant, and expanding the Mharda and Tishreen facilities—all designed to rejuvenate Syria's electric grid and centralize control back in Damascus. From the West's viewpoint, this Russian groundwork has essentially paved the way for future expansion at no extra cost to them.

The oil sector tells a similar story under the same 2015 plan, with upgrades to Syria's Homs refinery (its counterpart in Banias was also referenced). Targets included boosting capacity from 140,000 barrels per day (bpd) in Phase 1 to 240,000 bpd in Phase 2 and 360,000 bpd in Phase 3. Russia envisioned using it to process Iranian crude via Iraq for export to southern Europe. Pre-war, Syria pumped out about 400,000 bpd from 2.5 billion barrels of proven reserves, though production had dipped from nearly 600,000 bpd due to outdated recovery methods. Europe imported over $3 billion worth of Syrian oil annually before 2011, with refineries tailored to handle its heavy, sour 'Souedie' crude (the bulk of output) and lighter 'Syrian Light' grades. Roughly 150,000 bpd combined flowed to Germany, Italy, and France through ports like Banias, Tartus, and Latakia. International players in the mix included the UK's Shell, Petrofac, and Gulfsands Petroleum; France's former Total; China's National Petroleum Corporation; India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp; Canada's Suncor Energy; and Russia's Tatneft and Stroytransgaz.

With this infrastructure largely intact and funded by Moscow, it's no surprise that U.S. President Donald Trump lifted sanctions on Syria's gas and oil sectors on May 13. The UK and the EU had preceded him. Trump announced this in Riyadh, underscoring the need to involve other Middle Eastern nations in Syria's recovery to foster stability. Saudi Arabia, for instance, sees benefits in a stable Syria for its own ventures and export routes through the country to Europe. The UAE, alongside Saudi Arabia, is a cornerstone in Trump's vision, serving as a key Arab partner in Syria and his broader Middle East strategy of weaving economic and political ties with the U.S. and allies at the center. This echoes the Abraham Accords between Arab states and Israel, which I explore in detail in my book (https://www.amazon.co.uk/dp/B0C2RRNWNY).

The UAE's Dana Gas is a perfect fit for Western goals, having led gas redevelopment in Egypt and Iraq—two other focal points in the 'new global oil order.' In Iraq, it's thrived in the volatile Kurdistan region, recently launching gas sales from the Khor Mor expansion project (as detailed in https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/How-the-UAE-Has-Helped-Western-Oil-and-Gas-Majors-Return-to-Iraq.html).

And this is the part most people miss: These developments could deliver a triple win for the U.S. and allies. First, they position Western interests at the core of Syria's economic revival, influencing its future policies. Second, they integrate major Arab nations like the UAE into rebuilding a geopolitically vital state, paving the way for more Abraham Accord-style agreements. Third, they shut out Russia from these perks entirely. In the cutthroat world of geopolitics and energy maneuvers, this represents a major Western triumph.

But is this truly a win-win, or are we overlooking the risks of repeating colonial-like errors? Do you think involving Arab partners genuinely diffuses local resentment, or is it just a veneer for Western control? Share your thoughts in the comments—do you agree this sidelines Russia effectively, or could it backfire by fueling more instability?

By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com